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Abstract 
In 2017 and 2018, under National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) sponsorship, the 
New York Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Test 
Site and Northeast UAS Airspace Integration 
Research (NUAIR) Alliance conducted a year-long 
research project that culminated in a UAS 
technology flight demonstration. The research 
project included the creation of a concept of 
operations, and development and demonstration of 
UAS technologies. The concept of operations was 
focused on an unmanned aircraft transiting from 
cruise through Class E airspace into a high-density 
urban terminal environment. The terminal 
environment in which the test was conducted was 
Griffiss International Airport, under Syracuse Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) approach control and Griffiss 
control tower. Employing an Aurora Centaur 
optionally piloted aircraft (OPA), this project 
explored six scenarios aimed at advancing UAS 
integration into the National Airspace System (NAS) 
under both nominal and off-nominal conditions. Off-
nominal conditions were defined to include complete 
loss of the communications link between the remote 
pilot’s control station on the ground and the aircraft. 
The off-nominal scenarios that were investigated 
included lost-link conditions with and without link 
recovery, an automated ATC initiated go-around, 
autonomous rerouting around a dynamic airspace 
obstruction (in this case simulated weather), and 
autonomous taxi operations to clear the runway.  
Introduction 
Unmanned aircraft have the potential to 
revolutionize several different industries. Promising 
use cases for unmanned aircraft include, but are not 
limited to, telecommunications, cargo transportation, 
infrastructure inspection, and emergency response. 
In order to enable routine commercial UAS 
operations, UAS must be safely integrated into the 
NAS.  
There is currently a community wide effort to 
integrate UAS into the NAS that includes standards 
groups, government, and industry. RTCA is a 
standards developing organization (SDO) comprised 
of government and industry participants, which has 
developed standards for Detect and Avoid (DAA) 
and Command and Control (C2) systems for large 
unmanned aircraft and is in the process of developing 
standards for low size, weight, and power systems 
that may be used onboard medium size UAS [1,2]. 
The Federal Aviation Administration is developing 
policies for the certification and integration of UAS 
into the NAS [3]. Private industry is developing UAS 
and working toward certification. NASA, the New 
York UAS Test Site, and NUAIR Alliance have been 
supporting these efforts by conducting research and 
providing testbed infrastructure [4-7]. 
In 2017, NASA contracted with the New York 
UAS Test Site to conduct a UAS technology flight 
demonstration during the summer of 2018, focused 
on an unmanned aircraft larger than 55 pounds and 
capable of operating in controlled airspace. The 
objective of the demonstration was to demonstrate a 
set of UAS technologies motivated by a concept of 
operations for an unmanned aircraft arriving into a 
Class D airport. A second objective was to gain 
additional exposure to UAS technologies ahead of a 
series of demonstrations under NASA’s Systems 
Integration and Operationalization (SIO) activity, 
which is an ongoing partnership between NASA and 
industry. A further objective was to conduct safe 
UAS flight operations under stressful conditions as a 
way to increase UAS acceptance through 
demonstrating resiliency to off-nominal conditions.  
The activity described in this paper began with 
the creation of a concept of operations and 
identification of technologies and procedures that 
would be able to address gaps or hazards. Within the 
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one-year span of this activity, the technologies were 
prototyped and demonstrated aboard an Aurora 
Flight Sciences Centaur OPA. This activity also 
included ground-based DAA tests, which are 
described in [8], testing other DAA sensors, and 
work toward developing a redundant and 
cybersecure C2 link, although those parts of this 
activity are not covered in this paper.  
This paper describes the flight demonstration 
conducted by Centaur. The paper begins with a 
concept of operations and a description of the 
technologies selected to be demonstrated. Next the 
New York UAS Test Site infrastructure, the airspace, 
and the Aurora Centaur OPA are described, followed 
by a description of the six flight demonstrations. The 
paper ends with a discussion of lessons learned and 
takeaways from this activity.  
Concept of Operations 
This flight demonstration was based on a 
concept of operations for an unmanned aircraft 
transiting from Class A airspace through Class E 
airspace into a Class C or D terminal environment, 
landing, and taxiing off the runway. The concept of 
operations includes both nominal operations and off-
nominal operations. Off-nominal operations may 
include instances when the communications link 
between the unmanned aircraft and the ground 
control station is broken (lost-link) and may also 
include the need for trajectory modifications due to 
hazards such as convective weather or traffic. This 
section summarizes the concept of operations that 
was demonstrated but does not include every detail. 
The concept of operations was designed for 
beyond line of sight operations for unmanned aircraft 
that are greater than 55 pounds, arriving into a Class 
D airport. The unmanned aircraft was assumed to be 
flown by a remote pilot, who was responsible for 
communicating with air traffic control, following 14 
CFR §91 flight rules, and following other applicable 
aviation rules and regulations. During nominal 
operations the unmanned aircraft would operate in 
much the same way as a manned aircraft, making 
integration into the NAS feasible. Further, it was also 
assumed that the UAS would fly under Instrument 
Flight Rules (IFR) and that ATC would provide the 
same separation services provided to manned 
aircraft. 
It was assumed that the UAS would use a DAA 
system to remain well-clear of other traffic. The 
DAA system would use sensors and alerting 
algorithms to provide the remote pilot with 
information to ensure that the unmanned aircraft 
remained well clear of other traffic. Within this 
concept of operations, the assumption was that the 
DAA system could include airborne and ground 
based sensors and that the DAA system would be 
capable of detecting cooperative transponder-
equipped aircraft or aircraft that are providing ADS-
B information, and non-cooperative aircraft that may 
not have a transponder. It should be noted that while 
a high-level description of DAA was included in this 
concept of operations, this demonstration did not 
focus on rigorous DAA testing.  
Figure 1 is an overview of the concept of 
operations used for this flight demonstration. During 
a nominal arrival, the unmanned aircraft descends 
from either Class A or E airspace. Similar to manned 
operations, the remote pilot notifies ATC of intent to 
begin descent to the destination airport. After 
confirming that there is no conflicting traffic, ATC 
approach control authorizes the unmanned aircraft to 
proceed to the terminal area initial approach fix via a 
published/flight-planned route. The remote pilot 
monitors the traffic display and requests an ATC 
clearance when course deviations are necessary to 
remain well clear of other aircraft or hazardous 
weather. Lastly, the remote pilot executes an 
approach to the airport, coordinating with ATC to 
avoid traffic and weather as necessary. ATC 
approach control hands the unmanned aircraft off to 
the airport control tower for clearance to land. After 
receiving clearance to land, the unmanned aircraft 
lands and taxis off the runway. 
When the communications link between the 
ground control station and the unmanned aircraft is 
lost, the functions of the remote pilot must either be 
handled by automation onboard the unmanned 
aircraft or through augmented procedures. In this 
concept of operations, a combination of technology, 
procedures, and a preprogrammed contingency flight 
path are employed to ensure that the unmanned 
aircraft can land safety with minimal disruption to 
the NAS. 
During a lost-link situation, the remote pilot is 
expected to alert ATC of the lost-link status and 
provide the unmanned aircraft’s call sign, the type of 
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unmanned aircraft, time of lost-link, current/last 
known position, altitude, and direction of flight, and 
confirm its contingency procedure. Additionally, at 
the lost-link Notification Timer Offset, the 
unmanned aircraft squawks the pre-programmed 
lost-link code and broadcasts a pre-programmed 
notification of intent on appropriate emergency 
frequencies. ATC is responsible for ensuring other 
aircraft remain clear of the unmanned aircraft in 
accordance with normal emergency operations. The 
contingency procedure used in this flight 
demonstration included holding at a specified 
waypoint and then proceeding to land at a specified 
airport if the communications link was not 
reestablished within a specified period of time. 
However, the preprogrammed procedure does not 
account for other off-nominal events that may occur 
when the unmanned aircraft is flying the 
preprogramed contingency route.  
During a lost-link situation, an unmanned 
aircraft flying a preplanned contingency procedure 
may need the flexibility to handle dynamic events 
such as convective weather along the contingency 
route, an obstacle on the runway, or an obstacle on 
the taxiway. Additionally, it may be necessary for the 
unmanned aircraft to have the ability to 
autonomously taxi off the runway in order to avoid 
blocking an active runway for an extended period of 
time. The technologies described in the following 
section are possible methods for addressing these 
gaps.  
It should be noted that the authors do not claim 
that the technologies that were demonstrated as part 
of this activity should be implemented on every 
UAS. Instead, the specific concept of operations for 
each UAS should be evaluated to identify applicable 
hazards and either technological or procedural 
mitigations. Furthermore, the concept of operations 
developed for this activity did not address some 
Figure 1: Concept of Operations 
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advanced functionality that may be needed for 
particular commercial operations, such as how to 
handle contingency procedures that are updated 
during a flight (e.g., for an unmanned aircraft 
transiting from one airport to another), or procedures 
associated with a single pilot controlling multiple 
unmanned aircraft.  
UAS Technologies Demonstrated 
The concept of operations motivated the UAS 
vehicle technologies that were demonstrated. 
Selected technologies were designed to address gaps 
in the concept of operations. Due to the limited time 
available to develop and integrate new technologies 
during this year-long activity, many of the 
technologies demonstrated were at a low- to 
moderate- level of maturity. Further, in order to 
prevent costly modifications to Centaur’s auto flight 
system, the safety pilot was often required to close 
the loop between the prototyped UAS technologies 
and the aircraft’s systems. Additional development 
and testing would be required before these 
technologies could be integrated into an operational 
system.  
This paper discusses four different technologies 
that were demonstrated by the Aurora Centaur 
Optionally Piloted Aircraft (OPA). Those 
technologies include: automated lost-link procedures 
with synthesized voice notification of maneuvers, 
weather avoidance, ATC initiated go-around, and 
surface mapping and obstacle detection.  
Automated lost-link procedures were developed 
and programmed into Centaur’s auto flight system 
and a voice synthesis system was implemented to 
provide communication of maneuvers over a very 
high frequency (VHF) radio. If the communications 
link between Centaur and the ground control station 
were lost, Centaur would head direct to a specified 
waypoint, loiter for a period of time, and then 
proceed to the airport to land. When conducting 
these maneuvers, an automated voice transmission 
was generated by Centaur to alert air traffic 
controllers and other pilots on the VHF frequency 
about Centaur’s maneuvers. 
An algorithm to maneuver around regions 
containing convective weather was developed and 
demonstrated. Weather detection was not addressed 
in this activity, since the focus of this demonstration 
was on the interactions between an unmanned 
aircraft, the remote pilot, and ATC. A weather 
avoidance capability could be used during both 
nominal and lost-link scenarios. As in the automated 
lost-link procedures, an automated voice 
transmission was generated by Centaur to notify 
ATC and other pilots on the frequency of Centaur’s 
maneuvers during a lost-link weather avoidance 
scenario. That automated voice transmission was 
again deemed to be useful since neither the pilot in 
command nor ATC were assumed to know of 
weather avoidance maneuvers in advance. 
In addition to voice synthesis, a voice 
recognition algorithm was implemented to initiate a 
go-around based on a verbal command from ATC 
when the aircraft was in a lost-link situation. When 
an unmanned aircraft is in a lost-link situation, the 
remote pilot is unable to control the aircraft, and the 
aircraft must either rely on onboard automation or 
preprogrammed routes in order fly and land safely. 
One hazard that was identified was the possibility of 
an obstruction on a runway when an unmanned 
aircraft is attempting to land. The ability to recognize 
a voice command from air traffic control may 
provide unmanned aircraft in a lost-link situation 
with a mechanism for avoiding that hazard.  
 
Figure 2: LiDAR and Point-Tilt-Zoom Camera 
Installed on Centaur 
An airport surface mapping and obstacle 
detection system was implemented to enable Centaur 
to quickly and safety exit an active runway and taxi 
to a predefined location. This technology was 
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designed to prevent an unmanned aircraft in a lost-
link situation from landing and blocking an active 
runway for several minutes. The technology may 
also assist remote pilots during surface operations, 
since monitoring a camera may not provide the same 
level of situation awareness as looking out the 
aircraft’s window. The surface mapping and obstacle 
detection system used both a LiDAR for obstacle 
detection on the ground and both LiDAR and GPS to 
determine the aircraft’s location on the runway and 
taxiways. Figure 2 shows the LiDAR sensor which 
was added under the nose of the aircraft. 
Additional technologies outside the scope of 
this paper were also developed and demonstrated as 
part of this activity. Those demonstrations include 
ground-tests of a potential air-to-air radar for DAA, 
airborne tests of a pan-tilt-zoom camera designed to 
augment other DAA sensors, characterization of 
ground-based DAA radars, integration and 
demonstration of DAA displays and algorithms in 
the New York UAS Test Site operations center, and 
demonstration of a secure C2 link that can switch 
between different communication modalities to 
improve resiliency. 
Facilities and Unmanned Aircraft 
New York UAS Test Site 
The New York UAS Test Site, operated by 
Oneida County, New York, is one of seven national 
United States UAS test sites designated by the FAA 
under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 
2012, the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act 
of 2016, and most recently codified under the FAA 
Reauthorization Act of 2018. The mission of the 
FAA-designated UAS test sites is to contribute to 
FAA development of procedures, standards, and 
regulations necessary to support safe integration of 
UAS into the NAS. Under a teaming agreement with 
Oneida County, NUAIR acts as test site manager, 
responsible for UAS test range operational control 
and program management. A focus of the New York 
UAS Test Site and NUAIR is research, development, 
test, and evaluation for IFR-equipped UAS 
operations in the NAS. 
Griffiss International Airport 
The New York UAS Test Site’s base of 
operations is Griffiss International Airport, a public-
use airport owned and operated by Oneida County, 
New York. Griffiss International Airport has an 
11,800-foot runway, Class D airspace, an operating 
air traffic control tower, and ample test range 
airspace for UAS test operations. 
New York UAS Test Site Airspace 
As a non-federal public entity, Oneida County 
holds FAA Certificates of Waiver or Authorization 
(COAs) for the New York UAS Test Site. These 
COAs give the New York UAS Test Site the ability 
to conduct UAS operations within the airspace and 
operational constraints defined in the enabling 
legislation and described in the COAs.  
The New York COA airspace includes several 
regions that are coded as GSSD, GSS1, and GSS2 
(Figure 3). GSSD covers the Class D airspace 
surrounding Griffiss International Airport, extending 
upwards from the surface of the earth. GSS1 and 
GSS2, shown in Figure 3, extend from the surface 
through the upper limit of Class A airspace and into 
upper Class E airspace. Approval for an expanded 
COA, GSS5, was obtained partway through this 
activity. GSS5 covers a 6,7000 square mile area in 
Syracuse Approach Control airspace from the 
surface to 10,000 feet.  
 
Figure 3: New York UAS Test Site COA Airspace 
In the Griffiss COA airspace, Boston Air Route 
Traffic Control Center (ZBW) has jurisdiction over 
airspace above 10,000 feet above mean sea level 
(MSL), and Syracuse Approach Control has 
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jurisdiction below 10,000 feet MSL. All flights 
conducted for this activity were below 10,000 feet 
MSL; therefore, the flight demonstration team 
interacted with Syracuse Approach Control and the 
Griffiss Airport tower. 
Ground-Based Surveillance 
The New York UAS Test Site has installed a 
ground-based air traffic surveillance system. This 
test range instrumentation system can be used in 
conjunction with aircraft telemetry data to determine 
accurate position data, and as a test bed for new 
ground and airborne sensors and aircraft platforms.  
The sensors that comprise the ground-based 
surveillance system are: an SRC LSTAR V2 3-D 
radar, multiple SRC/Gryphon R1400 3-D X-band 
radars, and integrated Wide Area Multilateration 
(WAM) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) ground stations. Additionally, a 
Saab SR-3 X-band surface movement radar provides 
accurate location data for airport surface traffic. 
Operations Center 
Data from the ground-based surveillance 
system were collected, stored, and displayed in the 
operations center at Griffiss International Airport. A 
data wall of large flat-screen monitors is 
configurable for display of a variety of information 
including the airspace, data from each individual 
ground-based sensor, and multi-sensor fused data 
(Figure 4). The operations center includes 
workstations which can be used to run live-virtual 
simulations. The operations center also contains a 
data warehouse that houses data from each of the 
ground-based sensors. 
 
Figure 4: Operations Center at the New York 
UAS Test Site 
Aurora Centaur Optionally Piloted Aircraft 
The Aurora Centaur optionally piloted aircraft 
(OPA) was used for this flight demonstration (Figure 
5). Centaur is based on the commercially-available 
DA-42 MNG aircraft built by Diamond Aircraft 
Industries®, modified by Aurora as an OPA System. 
The modifications included a robotic system to 
control the aircraft’s physical controls and software 
to automate various aircraft functions. A large 
payload capacity and the ability to operate with and 
without an onboard pilot made the Aurora Centaur 
an ideal choice for this demonstration. 
Centaur can be operated in three different 
modes: manned, unmanned, or hybrid. In the 
manned configuration, the robotic system may be 
removed or simply deactivated while remaining 
installed in the aircraft. In unmanned configuration, 
the aircraft is controlled from a Ground Control 
Station with no onboard pilot. Hybrid mode allows 
for system control from a remote Ground Control 
Station, but with a safety pilot onboard. 
Centaur was operated in hybrid mode for this 
demonstration. The onboard safety pilot enabled the 
flight demonstration team to safely test lost-link 
scenarios. Furthermore, the safety pilot enabled 
Centaur to operate without operational restrictions 
typically required for unmanned aircraft, such as 
visual observers in a chase aircraft or on the ground. 
 
Figure 5: Aurora Centaur Optionally Piloted 
Aircraft 
Flight Demonstration Route 
A single arrival route was used for all flight 
demonstrations described in this paper. The route 
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was designed to simplify communications with ATC 
and ensure that the flight avoided populated areas to 
mitigate unnecessary risk.  
The nominal arrival route used for this 
demonstration consisted of the seven waypoints 
shown in Figure 6. A custom approach procedure 
connected the arrival route to the runway, enabling 
Centaur to conduct a fully autonomous arrival and 
approach. One key waypoint was KRECE, which 
was the loiter point for the lost-link contingency 
procedure. Additionally, the yellow line on Figure 6 
depicts a reroute due to a simulated weather polygon 
between CTORE and KRECE that was used for the 
weather avoidance demonstration.  
For the first flight test run, Centaur started at an 
initial altitude of approximately 9,000 feet, in order 
to collect radar surveillance data. Subsequent flight 
test runs started at HPARK at 4,000 feet in order to 
use flight time efficiently. Most of the scenarios, 
except for those demonstrating auto runway exit or 
auto-go around, ended at either GCOAL or ZLORE. 
 
Figure 6: Flight Demonstration Arrival Route 
Flight Demonstrations 
All technology demonstrations described in this 
paper used the Centaur OPA in hybrid mode.  
Centaur was controlled by a remote pilot using 
Centaur’s standard VCS-4586 ground control 
station, located within the Griffiss operations center.  
Onboard the aircraft, a safety pilot monitored 
the aircraft for safe operations including 
performance of the remain well clear responsibilities 
through coordination with the remote pilot, since no 
DAA capabilities were on the aircraft and no chase 
aircraft was used. A flight test engineer, located on 
the aircraft, monitored the technologies being 
demonstrated and performed other operations 
required by the demonstrations. 
Nominal Arrival 
During the nominal arrival, the Centaur flew the 
route from the first waypoint, HPARK, to the last 
waypoint GCOAL. During the approach, the aircraft 
descended to 3000 feet MSL at EDRUM and 1500 
feet MSL at GCOAL. Throughout the flight, either 
the remote pilot or the safety pilot interacted with 
ATC as a manned pilot aircraft would. This included 
handoffs between Syracuse Approach Control and 
the Griffiss tower, obtaining clearance to land, and 
responding to any other ATC instructions. 
Lost-Link with Recovery 
This scenario was the same as the nominal 
arrival, except the C2 link between the ground 
control station and Centaur was interrupted when 
Centaur was between CTORE and KRECE, and the 
C2 link was reestablished within the first four 
minutes of the loiter at KRECE. After losing the C2 
link, Centaur began automatically executing a 
programmed contingency procedure. For improved 
ATC and other airspace user situation awareness, 
speech synthesis was used to communicate 
Centaur’s location, altitude, intent, and lost-link 
status over the radio. An example of the message 
used in the demonstration is:  
Exercise, exercise, exercise. November five one 
alpha uniform – unmanned aircraft. 14.0 miles 
North of Griffiss airport at 3900 feet heading 
East; squawking seven four zero zero. In lost-
link – proceeding direct KRECE to hold. 
Exercise, exercise, exercise.” 
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It should be noted that the word “exercise” was 
used to indicate that this was a demonstration. In an 
actual lost-link scenario, the remote pilot would be 
required to notify ATC that the unmanned aircraft 
was in a lost-link situation and to ensure that ATC 
was aware of the contingency route the unmanned 
aircraft would follow.  
As shown in Figure 7, Centaur proceeded 
direct-to KRECE and began to loiter in accordance 
with the preprogrammed lost-link procedure. 
Partway through the loiter, the C2 link was 
reestablished and Centaur continued its descent to 
the airport.  
Lost-Link without Recovery 
This scenario was similar to the “lost-link with 
recovery” scenario, except the C2 link was never 
reestablished, requiring Centaur to execute the entire 
lost-link contingency procedure.  
As shown in Figure 8, the C2 link was 
interrupted when Centaur was between CTORE and 
KRECE, triggering a voice message similar to the 
one described in the previous section: 
“Exercise, exercise, exercise. November five 
one alpha uniform – unmanned aircraft. 13.4 
miles North of Griffiss airport at 4000 feet; 
heading East; squawking seven four zero zero. 
in lost-link – proceeding direct KRECE to hold. 
Exercise, exercise, exercise.” 
Centaur then proceeded direct-to KRECE and 
began a nine-minute loiter, after which Centaur 
would proceed to land at the airport if the C2 link 
could not be reestablished. Five minutes prior to 
exiting the loiter a second message was transmitted 
from Centaur over the radio: 
“Exercise, exercise, exercise. November five 
one alpha uniform – unmanned aircraft. 
Holding at KRECE; squawking seven four zero 
zero. in lost-link – executing approach to 
Griffiss airport in 5 minutes. Exercise, exercise, 
exercise.” 
Figure 7: Lost-Link with Recovery Scenario 
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The purpose of this message was to notify ATC and 
other airspace users that Centaur would exit the loiter 
and proceed to land at the airport if the C2 link could 
not be reestablished. When designing these 
procedures, this second message was deemed to be 
particularly important if the loiter time was long, 
since ATC and other airspace users may lose 
awareness of when the loiter would end. For 
example, the loiter time specified in the New York 
UAS Test Site COA is 30 minutes long but was 
shortened to nine minutes for the purpose of this 
demonstration. 
Five minutes after transmitting the message, 
Centaur exited the loiter area and flew the 
preprogrammed route toward the runway. During a 
real lost-link situation, the unmanned aircraft would 
automatically land. Since flying the approach and 
landing were demonstrated during other scenarios, 
this scenario ended at GCOAL in order to facilitate 
efficient use of flight time.   
Lost-Link with Go-Around 
This scenario was the same as the “lost-link 
without recovery” scenario, except a voice 
recognition system enabled Centaur to recognize a 
go-around command from the Griffiss Tower when 
Centaur crossed ZLORE (Figure 9).  
The rationale for implementing the voice 
recognition system was to provide ATC with a 
mechanism of communicating a go-around 
command if a hazard existed on the runway.  
In order to support this demonstration, a speech 
recognition system was implemented on the aircraft. 
The speech recognition was tuned to identify the 
phrase “November Five One Alpha Uniform, Execute 
Missed Approach.”  
When Centaur crossed ZLORE, the Griffiss 
tower controller requested the go around by 
transmitting on the tower frequency:  
“November Five One Alpha Uniform, Execute 
Missed Approach.”  
Figure 8: Lost-Link without Recovery Scenario 
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The system onboard Centaur automatically 
identified this request and transmitted a response: 
“November Five One Alpha Uniform, Executing 
Missed Approach” 
The aircraft then executed the missed approach 
procedure, which was a turning left-hand climb back 
to ZLORE. 
Three attempts were made at this 
demonstration, one of which was successful. There 
are several challenges associated with reliably 
recognizing an ATC voice command including noise 
on the frequency, inconsistent ATC phraseology, 
and the possibility of a bad actor spoofing an ATC 
communication. Furthermore, the system used in this 
demonstration was relatively immature and it is clear 
that improvements could be made with additional 
voice recognition training. These, and other 
challenges, are covered in the discussion section 
below.  
Lost-Link with Weather Avoidance 
This demonstration was an example of a 
scenario where the aircraft is forced to make a 
deviation from its predefined lost-link procedure due 
to an external disturbance. In this scenario the C2 
link was interrupted between CTORE and KRECE, 
triggering the following lost-link message 
transmitted over the radio: 
“Exercise, exercise, exercise. November five 
one alpha uniform – unmanned aircraft. 13.4 
miles North of Griffiss airport at 4000 feet; 
heading East; squawking seven four zero zero. 
in lost-link – proceeding direct KRECE to hold. 
Exercise, exercise, exercise.” 
After the C2 link was interrupted, the flight test 
engineer placed a simulated weather event between 
CTORE and KRECE, which required Centaur to 
plan a new path in order to avoid the simulated 
Figure 9: Lost-Link with Go-Around Scenario 
11 
weather.  Centaur transmitted an automated message 
on the radio to communicate the new path to ATC 
and to other aircraft in the area.  
“Exercise, exercise, exercise. November five 
one alpha uniform – unmanned aircraft. 13.6 
miles North of Griffiss airport at 4000 feet; 
turning left 20 degrees for weather. Expect 
direct KRECE in 1 minute. Exercise, exercise, 
exercise.” 
As shown in Figure 10, Centaur conducted a 
maneuver to avoid the weather and transmitted 
another message indicating when Centaur was clear 
of the weather and again proceeding direct to 
KRECE to begin loitering, as per the original 
procedure. 
“Exercise, exercise, exercise. November five 
one alpha uniform – unmanned aircraft. 15.4 
miles North of Griffiss airport at 3900 feet; 
proceeding direct KRECE to hold. Exercise, 
exercise, exercise.” 
Five minutes prior to the end of the loiter, 
Centaur transmitted another voice message over the 
radio to indicate that it would exit the loiter five 
minutes later and proceed toward the airport. The 
scenario ended after Centaur crossed ZLORE. 
Surface Awareness and Obstacle Detection 
The objective of this scenario was to 
demonstrate the ability of an unmanned aircraft to 
taxi off the runway while avoiding obstacles during 
a lost-link condition. Sensors were added to Centaur 
to sense its location on the runway or taxiway, 
determine the first runway exit after landing, and 
detect obstacles.  
The demonstration scenario is illustrated on the 
Griffiss Airport map shown in Figure 11. The aircraft 
landed on runway 33 prior to Taxiway D, proceeded 
past taxiway D and exited on taxiway C. After 
crossing taxiway A and approaching the apron, a 
truck was positioned as an obstacle after entering the 
Figure 10: Lost-Link with Weather Avoidance Scenario 
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apron. The truck location was placed so the aircraft 
would stop after leaving the active taxiways. 
The demonstration was performed under the 
control of the safety pilot, who landed the aircraft 
and taxied the aircraft to the apron. When the aircraft 
landed, an engineering display showed the first 
runway exit and the location of the aircraft on the 
runway or taxiway. The test engineers and the 
remote pilot observed the engineering display during 
the taxi maneuver to confirm that the location, 
intersection, and maneuver information was correct 
during taxi to the apron. When the truck was 
observed by the system, the remote pilot radioed the 
safety pilot to stop. Once stopped, the truck was 
cleared, and the aircraft was allowed to taxi to its 
parking location. 
The demonstration was executed successfully. 
The localization system worked well enough that the 
remote pilot and test team could monitor both during 
taxi out and taxi in during the actual demonstration. 
A couple of minor issues were observed: 
1. LiDAR would temporarily pick up obstacles off 
the edges of the taxiways as it was turning. This 
obstacle detection flickering issue could be 
resolved with more refined algorithms which 
could understand how the aircraft was 
maneuvering, i.e., knowing that the aircraft was 
turning so the obstacles were not actually in the 
expected path of the aircraft 
2. The “exit maneuver” criteria only worked 
effectively on the runway and not on the 
taxiways. This was expected since the system 
was not designed to be aware of the taxi plan, 
so when crossing a taxiway intersection where 
there were multiple valid turns, the system 
would need to be provided information on the 
intended path of the aircraft. 
3. The “Next intersection” determination would 
not switch as quickly as desired. This logic 
needed better information about the aircraft 
dynamics to more accurately determine when 
an exit is no longer viable. 
With minor improvements, this system would 
be a viable operational solution, though it would 
benefit from a more powerful LiDAR. The LiDAR 
chosen for this demonstration was purposely chosen 
for its low power to see how well it would perform. 
The main advantage to a more powerful LiDAR for 
this application would be better obstacle detection 
range. 
Discussion 
The UAS technologies that were demonstrated 
as part of this activity were intended to showcase 
how an unmanned aircraft could interact with ATC 
and other aircraft during an off-nominal lost-link 
situation. The concept of operations and UAS 
technologies developed for this demonstration 
assumed that there was a remote pilot in command 
of the aircraft. However, several of the ideas 
presented in this paper may also be applicable to 
unmanned aircraft with a greater level of autonomy. 
This section describes some of the lessons that were 
learned throughout this activity.  
During the lost-link scenarios, Centaur 
automatically generated voice messages to notify 
both ATC and other aircraft of its intent. When there 
Figure 11: Surface Awareness and Obstacle 
Detection Scenario 
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are no dynamic route modifications and the 
preprogrammed contingency route is followed, the 
automated voice messages are redundant with 
communications between the remote pilot and ATC. 
This is because the remote pilot is required to notify 
ATC of any lost-link situations and the unmanned 
aircraft’s contingency procedure. However, the 
automated messages still have the benefit of 
providing situation awareness to other aircraft in the 
area. The automated messages become significantly 
more useful when the unmanned aircraft must make 
dynamic modifications to the preprogrammed 
contingency route. In that situation, neither the 
remote pilot nor the ATC has knowledge of what the 
unmanned aircraft’s intended route is; therefore, the 
automated messages will enhance situation 
awareness. Additional feedback about the automated 
messages suggested a desire to make the messages as 
short as possible and emphasized the need for 
automation to prevent the unmanned aircraft from 
stepping on other transmissions, a task handled by 
the flight test engineer for this demonstration. 
The capability to recognize and implement a go-
around command from ATC was implemented as an 
additional layer of safety. The concept of operations 
specifies that the remote pilot notify ATC when the 
unmanned aircraft has lost its C2 link. It is then 
ATC’s responsibility to ensure that the airspace and 
runway are clear. However, without an alternate 
communication method, neither ATC nor the remote 
pilot would have a mechanism of waving off the 
unmanned aircraft if there was an obstruction on the 
runway. During this demonstration, there were 
several challenges identified with ATC voice 
recognition. Technical challenges include noisy 
voice transmissions and ATC phraseology that may 
not always be consistent with the specified 
command. Additionally, voice commands provided 
over the radio that modify the unmanned aircraft’s 
route present a security vulnerability. Limiting 
acceptance of the message to cases where the 
unmanned has lost its C2 link and is within a 
specified range of the airport would limit exposure 
to bad actors; however, it is not clear if those 
techniques would be sufficient. The future use of 
Controller Pilot Data Link Communications 
(CPDLC) may provide a method of transmitting 
commands from ATC without the technical and 
security challenges associated with voice 
commands.  
The surface awareness and obstacle detection 
system was designed to ensure that an unmanned 
aircraft that had lost its C2 link could safely clear an 
active runway in a timely manner. If the unmanned 
aircraft is unable to autonomously taxi off the 
runway and the C2 link cannot be reestablished, the 
aircraft may need to be towed off the runway. This 
would result in a significant disruption to operations 
and would likely not be acceptable to ATC. 
Furthermore, towing the unmanned aircraft would be 
problematic if the unmanned aircraft’s support crew 
are not located at the contingency airport or if the 
unmanned aircraft lands at a time when the airport is 
minimally staffed.  
Summary 
A flight demonstration of UAS technologies 
was sponsored by NASA and conducted at the New 
York UAS Test Site and their partners during the 
summer of 2018. The purpose of the flight 
demonstration was to showcase technologies 
designed to minimize the impact of an interrupted C2 
link between an unmanned aircraft and its ground 
control station. The technologies that were selected 
for demonstration were derived from a concept of 
operations and prototyped for this activity.  
For the demonstration, the Aurora Centaur OPA 
conducted six different demonstrations, including a 
nominal arrival scenario and the following five lost-
link scenarios:  
• the C2 link was lost and later reestablished, 
• the C2 link was lost and not reestablished, 
• the C2-link was lost, and a go-around 
maneuver was required, 
• the C2 link was lost and a weather 
avoidance maneuver was required, and 
• the C2 link was lost and the aircraft was 
required to autonomously taxi off the 
runway. 
In general, the demonstrations were completed 
successfully, though additional development and 
testing would be necessary before the prototype 
systems could be used in commercial systems. The 
concept of operations and demonstration 
emphasized the importance of communication with 
ATC if an unmanned aircraft in a lost-link scenario 
is required to modify its preplanned trajectory to 
avoid hazards such as weather. This flight 
demonstration also served the purpose of raising 
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ATC awareness and familiarity with UAS 
operations; particularly with lost-link operations.  
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